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The  interplay  between  factor  endowments,  institutional  development 
and economic performance has received considerable attention in recent 
years.  This  paper  exploits  the  importance  of  geographic  factors  and 
institutional  structures  for  explaining  patterns  of  settlement  and 
examines how these influenced growth outcomes. I find evidence that 
prospective  European  migrants  preferred  to  settle  in  regions  with 
favourable natural endowments and institutional packages designed to 
attract them. These settlers not only benefited from a growth-inducing 
institutional framework but also contributed actively to its quality in a 
mutually reinforcing relationship. Countries that competed for migrants 
achieved  higher  income  levels  through  institutional  development  and 
better provision of public goods. Finally, my findings show that the link 
between European migrants and economic development is not linear, as 
the positive effects of attracting European settlers on institutions and 
public  goods  are  set  off  only  when  European  populations  grow  to 
outnumber  other  ethnic  groups.  Countries  where  European  migrants 
remained  a  minority  were  more  likely  to  develop  institutions  that 









   3
 
(In the unlikely event of civilisation collapsing in Europe before new barbarian inroads) 
Europe would revive and flourish in the American world, which is already filled with 
her colonies and institutions. 




    1.      INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Recent literature on differences in economic performance across countries 
has resulted in an emerging consensus on the importance of institutional 
quality for growth in the long run. This trend results to a great extent from 
research  directed  at  studying  the  comparative  merits  of  institutions, 
geography and policies in explaining different development levels (see for 
instance,  (William  Easterly  and  Ross  Levine,  2002,  Dani  Rodrik  et  al., 
2002)).  This  view,  however  successful  in  identifying  institutions  as  the 
more  proximate  determinant  for  economic  performance,  explains  little 
about the underlying causes for such diverging institutional development. 
In this paper, I describe and examine the historical and geographical factors 
that had a lasting impact on the governance of the nations in the western 
hemisphere. Although institutions are important for all countries regardless 
of  their  geographic  location,  the  factors  that  explain  their  systematic 
improvement or persistence through time are different or at least have had 
varying degrees of influence in different parts of the world.  
 
Some  recent  research  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  European 
settlements  for  the  establishment  of  institutional  frameworks  that  are 
conducive to economic growth (Daron Acemoglu et al., 2001, S. Engerman 
                                                 
1 Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Iv). London: J.B. Bury, 
1896-1900.. Cited in Black, Jeremy. War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 
1450-2000. London: Yale University Press, 2000..   4
and K. Sokoloff, 2002). The argument is that settlement colonies (that is, 
colonies  where  the  population  from  European  descent  constitutes  the 
majority) replicated the institutional structure already known from Europe. 
On  the  other  hand,  societies  with  strong  ethnic  polarization  were  more 
likely to develop institutional structures that greatly advantaged members 
of colonial classes at the expenses of the indigenous population.   
(Edward Glaeser et al., 2004) support the view that European immigrants, 
in addition to European-style institutions, also brought themselves to the 
New World, i.e., their human capital which was higher than that of the 
indigenous population. Some accounts of this presumed higher capital are 
well known from previous literature: Europeans brought new techniques, 
new crops and livestock to the New World including sugar, cereals, horses, 
and cattle, thereby increasing dramatically agricultural productivity (Jared 
M. Diamond, 1997, David S. Landes, 1999). To this list I would like to add 
two  additional  considerations:  i)  migrants  were  initially  more  likely  to 
participate in the commercial economy and ii) were better placed to engage 
in  trade  with  native  Europe  than  Amerindian  or  African  populations. 
(Alessandra Casella and James E. Rauch, 1997) argue that exporters with 
ethnic connections to business groups in the export market have advantages 
over those who lack these ties. 
 
Little consensus exists on the channels through which institutional quality 
impacts  economic  development.  (Edward  Glaeser,  Rafael  La  Porta, 
Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes  and  Andrei  Shleifer,  2004)  find  that  most 
indicators of institutional quality used in recent literature are flawed. In 
particular,  they  are  highly  critical  of  using  risk  of  expropriation  by 
government,  government  effectiveness,  or  constraints  on  government  as 
measures of institutional quality. However, they agree on the importance of 
secure  property  rights.  In  fact,  rarely,  if  ever,  do  historians  dispute  the   5
importance of well-defined private property rights for long-term economic 
development. 
Property  rights  are  positively  related  to  second  tier  factors  such  as 
investment,  technology  transfer,  efficiency  in  resource  use,  and  well 
developed  markets  for  land  and  capital  (Jeffrey  B.  Nugent  and  Vitória 
Saddi,  2002).  These  positive  outcomes  are  a  result  of  the  advantages 
intrinsic to property rights: 
 
￿ Owners  are  more  willing  to  invest  thereby  increasing  the 
productivity of land 
￿ The  development  of  a  market  for  land  leads  to  competitive 
pressure for its efficient use 
￿ The availability of land as collateral (leading to the development 
of a credit market) 
   
As for reasons that help explain diverging development of property rights, 
see figure 1.1.  
Regardless of which  view is  adopted, institutional development through 
human  capital  or  relative  inequality,  there  is  strong  evidence  of  the 
importance  transatlantic  migrations  had  for  subsequent  development 
outcomes in the New World.   
 
The  published  evidence  for  the  important  role  played  by  European 
populations and their descendants is, nonetheless, confined to the Americas 
and Oceania. The simple average fraction of European population in North 
and South American countries is 25% (the median is 11%), and ranges 
from approximately 0% in Haiti and Jamaica to 97% in Argentina
2. Mexico 
is the only  major country, among the 5 most populous countries in the 
American mainland, where this fraction is inferior to 20% (with 9%).  
                                                 
2 For data on the fraction of population from European descend, see table A3.   6
The  fraction  of  population  from  European  descent  was  generally  much 
lower in Africa, with highest values in South Africa (22%) and Mauritius 
(17%). Equally important, European colonization in Africa started much 
later than in the Americas, as it only was possible in the late 19
th century 
when repetition guns and quinine became readily available to combat local 
opposition  and  endemic  malaria,  respectively.  Additionally,  European 
settlements were frequently not permanent and many settlers left after the 
independence  of  the  new  African  nations  in  the  1960’s,  European 
settlements  in  Asia  were  numerically  even  less  relevant,  as  most  Asian 
nations never were serious candidates to become settlement colonies due to 
high local population densities before their “discovery” by Europeans.  
Another important factor of European influence is direct rule over colonies, 
which ended one or two centuries ago in most of the western hemisphere 
but was much more recent in Africa. The institutions that colonial powers 
set  up  in  Africa  were  designed  for  extractive  policies  with  the  aim  of 
transferring  the  mineral  and  agricultural  resources  of  the  colonies  to 
Europe.  These  institutions  frequently  persisted  as  accession  to 
independence  often  resulted  in  a  new  local  elite  replacing  the  colonial 
administration as the receptor of the gains from extractive institutions. 
(David N. Weil, 2005) sums up this point by stating that most of Asia was 
not colonized at all, or if colonized, managed to maintain its pre-colonial 
civilization,  population,  and  language.  He  further  argues  that  European 
control over Africa was more complete than over Asia, but it never resulted 
in  the  wholesale  displacement  of  the  native  population  (as  in  the 
Americas).    The  varying  importance  of  European  settlements  suggests 
significant heterogeneity in explanatory factors of economic development, 
i.e.,  the  possibility  that  different  fundamental  determinants  may  exert 
varying degrees of influence in hindering or facilitating development in 
different subsets of countries (Chih Ming Tan, 2004, Luís Vaz Silva, 2004).   7
Considering the heterogeneity resulting from the very different historical 
and geographical settings, this chapter will restrict the sample to North and 
South  American  countries  only.  The  next  section  briefly  describes  the 
historical  background  and  examines  the  consequences  of  very  different 
settlement policies within one single country, in this case Brazil. Section 3 
summarizes the data and descriptive statistics, while section 4 presents new 
empirical  evidence  on  the  relationships  between  factor  endowments, 




    2.      THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
  
2.1  The Western Hemisphere 
 
 
The first mover in the colonization of the New World was Spain. Spain 
chose Mexico and the more temperate highland regions of tropical South 
America as the core of its new overseas empire. These were already the 
most densely populated areas in the Americas, permitting the Spaniards to 
live  from  the  fruit  of  the  natives’  labour  once  they  had  successfully 
replaced  the  local  elite  as  the  new  ruling  class.  Spanish  America  was 
characterized by a relatively restrictive immigration policy when compared 
to  the  more  neutral  or  favourable  immigration  policies  of  British  or 
Portuguese America. Restrictions on immigration to Spanish America were 
based on nationality and religion, whereas restrictions on immigration to 
Portuguese  America  were  only  based  on  religion  thereby  allowing 
significant immigration from Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain.   
Consequently,  people  from  Spanish  descent  constitute  a  minority  (1%-
21%)  in  the  mainland  area  situated  between  Mexico  in  the  North  and   8
Peru/Bolivia in the south. The only noteworthy exception in this region is 
Costa Rica (Spanish account for circa 75% of the population), a country 
that after independence actively encouraged immigration and whose small-
scale agriculture was exceptional for the region.      
 
A second group of immigrants was attracted to the tropics that remained 
outside Spanish control,  mostly North-eastern Brazil and the Caribbean. 
These regions eventually specialized in cash crops such as tobacco, indigo, 
cotton, and most of all sugarcane. The plantation of sugar, in particular, had 
important  demographic  consequences,  as  sugar  was  best  grown  on 
relatively  large  estates  with  slave  labour.  It  was  the  most  important 
commodity  in  world  trade  in  the  17
th  and  18
th  centuries  and  the  high 
marginal productivity of labour in the sugarcane plantations secured the 
means to finance a constant flow of slaves to cultivate them.     
The choice of North-eastern Brazil as the first sugar growing area seems 
obvious:  vast and scarcely populated land with suitable climate adding to 
the familiarity that Portuguese had already achieved with the methods of 
cultivation  and  manufacture  in  their  Atlantic  Islands  (mostly  Madeira). 
However, Brazilian Amerindians proved unsuitable for estate labour and 
could not be made slaves after 1570
3. In the meanwhile, Portugal had in the 
sixteenth century direct access to the slave trading kingdoms of Central and 
Western Africa, and the consequent transoceanic slave trade set the pattern 
for what came to be the forced mass migration of millions of Africans to 
the New World
4.  
The prices of slaves were set in competitive international markets without 
any national or cultural barriers to owning or using them. It is interesting to 
note that changing Portuguese positions on slavery did not apply to black 
slavery until the mid-eighteenth century. Even the great Jesuit missionary 
                                                 
3 King Dom Sebastião ruled on March 20, 1570 that they should not be made slaves by Portuguese 
colonists in Brazil, except in certain circumstances which included “just war”. 
4 The first order for West African slaves originated in Hispaniola in 1517.    9
and  preacher  António  Vieira  (1608-1697)  advocated  increased  slave 
imports  from  Africa  into  Brazil  to  guarantee  the  continued  freedom  of 
Amerindians (A.J.R. Russell-Wood, 1978). Brazil was not included in the 
abolition of  slavery  in  Portugal  (1761) due  to irreconcilable differences 
between the enlightened minority in Lisbon and the numerically superior 
colonists in South America on the issue of black slavery.       
Dutch  presence  in  North-eastern  Brazil  in  the  mid-seventeenth  century 
enabled  the  dissemination  of  sugar  producing  techniques  into  the  West 
Indies, and ultimately the mass importation of African slaves to the islands. 
In the period 1517-1760 approximately 3.9 million Africans arrived in the 
Americas against 2.1 million Europeans
5, and considering that the majority 
of the Africans were sold in the Caribbean and Brazil it becomes clear that 
this region absorbed the bulk of immigration to the Western Hemisphere 
prior to this date. Within a few decades in the seventeenth century Africans 
became a majority, and this demographic pattern has persisted to this day 
throughout the region. 
  
The  last  group  of  immigrants  decided  to  settle  in  the  more  temperate 
regions of the New World, first in the northern hemisphere and later also in 
the southern tip. These new countries originated from massive European 
immigration  and  their  institutions  and  societies  closely  resemble  their 
European  counterparts.  The  native  populations,  already  numerically 
inferior to those of Spanish America, suffered from very high mortality 
rates  due  to  lack  of  immunity  to  the  new  diseases  that  arrived  with 
European  migrants.  Those  who  survived  were  often  dislocated  to  less 
productive land. By 1800, in present-day Canada and the United States, 
only about 600000 Indians remained, already a small minority in a region 
                                                 
5 Engerman, S. and Sokoloff, K. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among 
New World Economies," NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA, 2002..   10
dominated by 5 million Europeans and 1 million African-American slaves 
(Alan Taylor, 2002). 
Included  in  this  group  are  two  countries  in  North  America  (USA  and 
Canada), one in Central America (Costa Rica) and four in South America 
(Chile,  Argentina,  Uruguay and  Brazil). Although all of these countries 
have  a  majority  population  from  European  descent,  some  important 
distinctions  remain  between  them:  Brazil  and  the  USA  have  significant 
African minorities whilst in Chile half the population is Indian. The most 
homogeneous populations in this group can be found in Canada, Argentina 
and Uruguay. 
 Equally important is the pattern of land ownership, which was much more 
widespread in North America, where around 1900 most rural households 
owned land. The proportion of landownership was highest in Canada, and 
fell gradually towards the Southern U.S., where large estates were more 
familiar. Nowhere in Latin America was the prevalence of land ownership 




The consequences of these very different initial endowments are reflected 
in the diverging paths of growth among these groups of countries. The first 
group  comprises  the  settlement  colonies, normally  situated in  temperate 
regions, which were characterized by more homogeneous populations and 
relatively low inequality. The U.S. and Canada became the economically 
most successful countries in this group, whilst the remaining (from Chile to 
Brazil) form a sort of  middle ground between the rich North American 
nations  and  the  less  developed  countries  in tropical  regions.  The  North 
American  countries  benefited  from  a  homogeneous,  well-educated 
population  and  largely  disseminated  landownership,  resulting  in  broad 
participation  in  the  commercial  economy.  The  fulfilment  of  this 
                                                 
6 Although landholding was significantly more common in Argentina and São Paulo than in Mexico.    11
precondition  for  capital  formation  contrasts  with  a  somewhat  narrower 
participation  in  the  Mercosul  countries,  and  helps  explaining  the  early 
industrialization in North America. Argentina never had a land policy like 
the US or Canada, with most of the land being sold by the state in much 
larger blocks to a few big landholdings. This results in class polarization 
being more prevalent in the Argentine society than ethnic polarization. 
 
The group of tropical countries have more heterogeneous populations and 
accordingly  higher  levels  of  inequality.  Also,  rent  seeking  is  more 
attractive  for  ethnically  polarized  societies  because  redistribution  of 
existing resources towards one particular group becomes  more tempting 
than  in  a  society  without  evident  ethnic  or  class  distinctions  (William 
Easterly, 2000). The minority of European descent holds a disproportionate 
amount of wealth and political influence at the expense of the Indian or 
African majorities. (David L. Weimer, 1997) finds that if key agents value 
highly personal political power over economic or social gain, they  may 
defeat rule changes that may be socially beneficial.  
Accordingly,  the  ruling  classes  utilized  several  instruments  in  order  to 
maintain  the  existing  status  quo  and  their  members  in  competitive  rent 
seeking positions: 
 
￿ Restrictions on voting  
￿ Low school enrolment 
￿ Language 
 
Latin  American  countries  had  restrictions  on  voting  until  the  early  20
th 
century.  Unlike  the  US,  which  also  adopted  racial  limitations,  Latin 
American countries typically chose to screen by literacy or wealth (and 
lacked secrecy in balloting until much later). As a result of these different   12
restrictions on voting rights, much higher fractions of the populations voted 
in the United States or Canada than anywhere else in the Americas.  
It  is  precisely  the  countries  that  competed  for  migrants  (Argentina, 
Uruguay,  and  Costa  Rica)  that  first  liberalized  voting  and  extended 
schooling  to  the  bulk  of  the  population.  The  result  of  these  different 
policies towards the provision of public goods, like mass education, is still 
visible today and can be seen in the last column of table A4. Apart from 
small Caribbean states, the lowest rates of illiteracy in Latin America are 
those  of  Uruguay  (2.3%)  and  Argentina  (3%),  whereas  the  highest  are 
recorded  for  Haiti  (48.1%),  Alagoas  (North-eastern  Brazil;  30.6%),  and 
Guatemala (30.1%).  
Language  is  the  third  instrument  of  discrimination  against  particular 
population  subgroups.  Social  groups  whose  members  do  not  speak  the 
official  language  will  have  difficulty  in  engaging  with  government 
institutions, considering that official documents are written and published 
in the official language. Also, banking and capital formation is made more 
difficult because these groups are more likely to experience difficulties in 
participating in credit and banking-like transactions.  
Table A6 presents in column 2 data on a variable that measures the fraction 
of the population that does not speak the official language (GUNN1). The 
data is presented as cited in (William Easterly and Ross Levine, 1997) and 
is  based  on  the  work  of  (Erik  Gunnemark,  1992).  Observations  for 
countries with strong European immigration are always lower than 10%, 
and are zero for Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile. On the other hand, all 
observations above this threshold, bar those for Suriname and Paraguay, lie 
in the core areas of Spanish colonization. Estimates are particularly high 
for Bolivia (55.9%), Peru (31.8%), and Ecuador (28.6%) in South America, 
and  Belize  (40.9%),  Guatemala  (33.3%),  and  Mexico  (11.1%)  in  the 
Central America. Belize is the only non-Spanish speaking country in this 
sample  and  as  such  could  serve  as  a  natural  experiment.  It  seems  that   13
having had a different colonizer did not improve the assimilation of the 
(European) official language. The high illiteracy rate (23.1%) suggests that 
Britain did not invest more in public goods in this region than Spain did, 
and might explain partially the very high fraction of the population that 
does not speak the official language.  
What do these countries, with low dispersion of knowledge of the official 
language  among  the  native  population,  have  in  common?  One 
interpretation, here advanced, is that the percentage of the population that 
does  not  speak  the  official  language  is  a  function  of  i)  high  native 
population  densities  and  ii)  poor  provision  of  public  goods,  i.e.,  mass 
education  by  the  state.  Remarkably,  countries  with  significant  African 
populations (Caribbean/Brazil) do not present the same degree of linguistic 
fractionalization (Suriname is the exception). Resistance to the adoption of 
a  major  European  language  is  mostly  a  preserve  of  the  Incan  and 
Mayan/Aztec world. 
 
At  this  point  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  countries  where 
Europeans constitute the majority of the population and countries where 
they are a minority. Although countries with mostly European populations 
did  better  than  others  at  developing  their  economic  institutions,  their 
specific weight on overall population is certainly not the only determinant 
and  may  not  even  be  the  most  important  explanatory  factor  for 
development. This is particularly evident for countries where Europeans 
are a minority, and a look at Central America might shed some light on this 
issue:  Nicaragua  had  one  of  the  highest  fractions  of  Europeans  in  total 
population,  yet  developed  property  rights  later  than  El  Salvador  or 
Guatemala and its agriculture was mostly characterized by large holdings. 
Costa  Rica,  Colombia,  El  Salvador  and  Guatemala  have  all  common 
terrain, climate and legal and colonial backgrounds, but Guatemala and El 
Salvador  developed  property  rights  later  and  predominantly  for  large   14
plantations  (mostly  smallholders  in  Costa  Rica  and  Colombia).  This 
ranking predicts quite well present day development levels: Costa Rica and 
Colombia became more democratic and invested more in education, while 
El Salvador and Guatemala form a middle group. Nicaragua, in spite of 
having  more Europeans (its population mix resembles  more Colombia’s 
ethnic composition), is by far the least developed country in this group. 
(Jeffrey B. Nugent and James A. Robinson, 2000) explain this difference in 
institutional development by setting private property rights as a function of 
the existence of schism among the elites. The argument is that in countries 
where such a rupture existed, the elites had the necessity to attract larger 
proportions of the population to their side and the way to do so is through 
granting  effective  property  rights.  Guatemala  and  El  Salvador  were 
governed by a conservative alliance, where the European minority either 
controlled directly or was supported by most of the relevant institutions 
such  as  the  army  or  the  church.  Consequently,  these  countries  lacked 
internal competition (political or other) and witnessed the development of 
large estates with monopsony power over labour.                 
 
           
    2.2  Brazil 
 
 
Diverging  growth  paths  exist  not  only  between  different  countries,  as 
substantial differences in economic performance within one single country 
have long been acknowledged. The contrasts between the U.S. North and 
the U.S. South are, possibly, the most often referred in literature, although 
the degree of inequality within the U.S. is quite modest by the standards of 
Brazil.  
The U.S. South achieved higher development than Latin America partly for 
the reasons that its climate is unsuited for sugar plantations. The U.S. South   15
specialized in crops (Tobacco, Rice, Cotton) that exhibited limited scale 
economies,  hence  the  share  of  slave  populations  and  consequently  the 
degree  of  inequality  was  lower  than  those  of  the  Caribbean/Brazil. 
Secondly,  many  of  the  significant  economic  institutions  were  either 
determined at the national level or shaped by competition among states, 
therefore had many features in common with northern states ((S. Engerman 
and K. Sokoloff, 2002)). The U.S. is essentially a temperate country with a 
relatively  small  subtropical  part,  whilst  Brazil  is  essentially  a  tropical 
country with a relatively small temperate part in the south. 
 
Another factor that contributed to different patterns of landholding in the 
New  World  consists  of  different  sets  of  property  rights.  Initially,  the 
property rights in North and South America reflected the property rights in 
the country of origin (Lee J. Alston and Bernardo Mueller, Forthcoming). 
However,  differences  soon  emerged:  in  contrast  to  English  tradition, 
multigeniture  was  common  in  the  northern  U.S.  where  it  was  more 
important  to  motivate  all  members  of  the  family.  Conversely,  in  the 
southern  U.S.,  with  its  greater  use  of  slave  and  indentured  labour, 
primogeniture contributed to  maintain large agricultural units  that  could 
capture  the  economies  of  scale  there  existent.  Thus,  primogeniture  was 
partly  responsible  for  the  greater  concentration  of  wealth  and  political 
power in the southern colonies. It was not until 1798 that all states adopted 
multigeniture. 
Different  property  rights  also  affected  other  parts  of  the  Americas,  as 
indentured  servitude  was  illegal  in  Spanish  and  Portuguese  America. 
Indentures made up approximately 70% of the free white immigrants to 
North America in the 17
th and 18
th centuries (Lee J. Alston and Bernardo 
Mueller, Forthcoming) as the migrants did not have the means to pay for 
their  transportation.  This  prohibition  of  indentured  servitude,  combined 
with the low population density of Portugal (resulting in less incentive to   16
emigrate), resulted in Brazil being scarcely populated by Portuguese in the 
17
th century. 
This absence of settlers changed gradually during the 17
th century due to 
increased global demand for sugar and accordingly higher incomes in sugar 
growing regions. These early settlers received large grants of land through 
sesmarias.  The sesmaria is an institution that dates back to 1375 when 
Portugal,  severely  affected  by  the  consequences  of  the  bubonic  plague, 
needed to increase agricultural productivity and settlement in rural areas. 
The holder of a sesmarias had complete property rights over land with the 
exception  clause  of  beneficial  use,  whose  purpose  was  to  encourage 
settlement (holding the land idle might result in loss of title). This set of 
institutions persisted for centuries (the beneficial use clause was reaffirmed 
in the Brazilian constitution of 1988) and was successful in encouraging the 
settlement  of  most  of  contemporary  Brazil.  However,  it  did  not  attract 
many voluntary settlers until the 18
th century because in order to petition 
for  a sesmaria  a  prospective  migrant  had  to own the  capital  to  finance 
slaves and a sugar mill.                      
The  north-eastern  parts  of  Brazil  proved  particularly  suitable  for  the 
plantation of sugarcane and their population was the first in the Americas 
to  become  dominated  by  large  numbers  of  African  slaves.  This 
demographic pattern persisted well into the twentieth century. 
 
In contrast, the South and Southeast came to attract considerable numbers 
of European settlers, in particular after 1808. In this year, the Portuguese 
authorities  adopted  a  more  encouraging  immigration  policy,  authorizing 
foreigners to buy and own land, with the intentions to settle the temperate 
south (disputed with Spain) and to create a “white Brazil”. 
Brazil had a relatively early nationwide Land Law (1850), but this law was 
for  the  most  part  a  result  of  a  political  deal  between  the  northern  and 
southern provinces, where the North agreed to support the Land Law in   17
exchange for a (merely) gradual abolition of slavery (Jeffrey B. Nugent and 
Vitória  Saddi,  2002).  This  first  Land  Law,  although  not  effective  in 
increasing  land  registration  and  titling,  succeeded  in  encouraging 
immigration  as  a  means  to  provide  an  elastic  supply  of  labour,  itself 
threatened  by  the  impending  abolition  of  slavery.  Moreover,  coffee 
producers in São Paulo could not afford slaves and thus had even more 
reasons to encourage immigration. This situation shows similarities with 
the one encountered in the U.S., where slavery was less prevalent in the 
North because most northerners simply could not afford slaves and their 
value was lower than in the South. Unlike sugar, the cultivation of coffee 
was accessible to smallholdings. 
The Brazilian Parliament was in the 1840s aware of and even debated the 
Australian failure in generating self-sustaining agricultural expansion by 
financing immigration through land sales (Paul A. Rivera et al., 2004). This 
failure was mostly due to competition from the U.S. where land could be 
obtained at virtually no cost; therefore Brazil needed a land law that could 
provide  land  to  immigrants  at  very  low  prices.  State  expenditure  on 
immigration  was  equally  important  for  South  American  countries  since 
greater  distance  from  Europe  (relatively  to  North  America)  had  to  be 
compensated with direct subsidies to the immigrants. São Paulo State was 
particularly successful in attracting immigrants due to the complementarity 
between its land and immigration policies
7.  
The first meaningful Land Law in Brazil was enacted by the São Paulo 
state only in 1895. It was only then, and initially only in this state, that land 
registration and titling became common. It was the advent of the Republic 
in 1889, and the consequent granting of increased autonomy to the federal 
states  that  allowed  São  Paulo  to  advance  with  its  own  Land  Law,  as 
devolution resulted in different laws and property rights from state to state. 
                                                 
7 During the 1890s São Paulo attracted 17% more migrants than Argentina (Rivera, Paul A.; Nugent, 
Jeffrey B. and Saddi, Vitória. "Abolition and the Evolution of Property Rights in Land: The Role of 
Immigrant Labor and Its Recruitment in Brazil," California State University Channel Islands. 2004.).    18
This Land Law was successful in reducing the bureaucratic process and 
thereby lowered the costs of land registration and titling.   
Eventually, a higher inflow of immigrants in São Paulo resulted in faster 
development  of  land  tenure  than  in  the  neighbours  to  the  north,  Minas 
Gerais  and  Rio  de  Janeiro  (also  coffee  producers).  Among  the  major 
outcomes of the State of São Paulo immigration program, five must be 
referred to: 
 
￿ Solved labour shortages on coffee farms during the transition 
to the free labour economy 
￿ Immigrants became coffee producers 
￿ Creation  of  a  whole  coffee  complex  (coffee  producers 
became  exporters,  bankers,  factors,  railroad  owners  and 
politicians) 
￿ Increased precision of land rights (average price of land was 
higher than in any other state) 
￿ More small sized properties in São Paulo than in any other 
coffee-growing state 
 
This is not to say that being a coffee-producing state was indispensable to 
the development of land rights in Brazil. The two southernmost states in the 
Federation, Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, had small properties and 
a well developed system of land tenure even earlier than São Paulo. This 
region  progressed,  largely  through  immigration,  from  a  relatively 
conservative  and  isolated  ranching  region  that  was  itself  politically 
marginal and economically underdeveloped within Brazil (Lauren Benton, 
2002) to one of the most prosperous and socially most progressive regions 
of South America
8. Paraná, the coffee-producing third state of Southern 
                                                 
8 See table A4.   19
Brazil developed its land rights somewhere in between Minas Gerais and 
São Paulo.        
Nonetheless, even increased regularization of land rights in São Paulo did 
not reduce the political power of the colonels (informal political leaders) 
since their interests and sources of wealth were more diversified than in 
other states. In conclusion, immigration policies and the development of 




3.  THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 Appendix A contains the data on the variables used in this paper. Table A1 
presents the complete list of variables used, together with their respective 
definitions  and  sources,  while  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  same 
variables can be seen in table A2. 
 
Table A3 reports my estimates for the fraction of overall population that is 
of  European  descent  in  the  countries  of  the  western  hemisphere.  The 
starting point consists of the estimates used by (Daron Acemoglu, Simon 
Johnson and James A. Robinson, 2001);henceforth AJR), which are visible 
in column 1. Column 2 adds the most recent estimates available in the CIA 
World Factbook. It is important to note that these estimates are not directly 
comparable  as  AJR’s  numbers  refer  to  1975  and  not  to  present-day. 
Column 3 shows the estimates used in this paper, which are for the most 
part resulting from the data in the previous columns. When different from 
the estimates in columns 1 and 2, the alternative source is indicated in the 
notes.   20
The prevailing trend is to revise AJR’s estimates downwards. Where AJR’s 
estimates have an average of 32%, the new estimates have a mean of 25%. 
Some of the differences are very large and cannot be explained due to the 
passage of a quarter  of a  century.  Differences are particularly  large  for 
Ecuador (revised downwards from 30% to 7%), Trinidad and Tobago (from 
40% to 1%), and Costa Rica (upwards from 20% to 75%). 
According to this new data on the ethnic composition of North and South 
American countries, three regions have particularly small white minorities 
(3% or less of total population): Caribbean Islands (Jamaica, Haiti), the 
region to the south of Mexico (Guatemala, Honduras, Belize), and North-
east  South  America  (Trinidad  &  Tobago,  Guyana,  Suriname).  The only 
noteworthy  exception  is  Paraguay,  which  has  the  highest  fraction  of 
Mestizo population (95%) in the hemisphere
9.  
The  most  predominantly  white  populations  exist  in  the  northern  and 
southern tips of the hemisphere: Argentina (97%) and Uruguay (88%) in 
the southern tip, and Canada (87%) and the USA (77%) in North America. 
Again there is one exception to this rule of thumb, in this case Costa Rica 
(75%), which competed successfully for European immigrants in spite of 
its tropical location. 
 
Table A4 presents data on social and economic variables for the countries 
and Brazilian federal states that constitute this sample. The observations are 
ranked  in  descending  order  from  the  wealthiest  country  (USA)  to  the 
poorest country in the hemisphere (Haiti). It is hardly surprising that most 
of the top twenty observations evolved from settlement colonies and have 
at present at least half of the population from European descend. The few 
exceptions consist mostly of small Caribbean island states (Bahamas and 
Barbados), oil producing and exporting economies (Trinidad and Tobago), 
                                                 
9 This exceptional status of Paraguay can be partly explained by the History (the De Francia dictatorships 
in the 19
th century favouring miscegenation of the population).    21
or others (Mexico and Amazonas)
10. Conversely, all countries or states with 
a majority of European population are ranked in the upper half of this table 
with the poorest of them, Goiás in centre-west Brazil, ranked 28
th out of 55 
observations. 
A second conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that settlement 
colonies of British origin were economically  more successful than their 
Latin American counterparts. However, the identity of the colonizer does 
not explain entirely this differential development as Argentina and Uruguay 
developed  in  the  first  century  after  independence  more  according  to  a 
pattern  similar  to  that  of  the  northern  American  countries.  Uruguay 
remained wealthier than Canada until 1900 and both countries still had in 
the 1950’s an income per head in line with those prevailing in Western 
Europe
11.  The  gap  that  now  exists  between  these  two  Latin  American 
countries and the developed world is mostly a result of the last half-century 
as they became more alike their southern American neighbours to the west 
(Chile) and east (Southern Brazil) due to relative economic stagnation of 
the former and faster development in the latter. 
Finally, columns three and five present data on the Gini coefficients and 
illiteracy  rates  respectively.  As  expected,  both  variables  are  negatively 
correlated with GDP per head, and the relationship is somewhat stronger 
with  illiteracy  rates  (coefficient  of  correlation  is  -0.57)  than  with  the 
measure of inequality (coefficient of correlation is –0.36).  
 
The data for the institutions variables are reported in table A5. The first 
four columns show the indexes that were considered for the new composite 
institutions index, whose estimates are listed in column 5. According to this 
new  index,  the  best  institutional  quality  is  found  in  North  America 
followed by the Latin American countries which had competed in the past 
                                                 
10 Amazonas is a relatively sparsely populated and resource rich federal state with export-oriented 
industries located in the capital city (Manaus). 
11 See Maddison, Angus. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD, 2003. for historical 
statistics on GDP per head.   22
for European migrants: Chile (6.47), Uruguay (5.37), Costa Rica (5.25), 
and Brazil (4.86). The only noteworthy exception to this list is Argentina 
whose estimate is below sample average (3.67). It is likely that Argentine 
ratings  were  considerably  affected  by  the  severe  economic,  social,  and 
political crisis of the last few years. 
As discussed in the introduction to this paper, little consensus exists on the 
channels through which institutional quality impacts on economic growth 
(except  for  secure  property  rights).  (Edward  Glaeser,  Rafael  La  Porta, 
Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes  and  Andrei  Shleifer,  2004)  are  particularly 
critical of some of the measures for institutions used in recent literature on 
growth, but these indicators are not used for the composite index used in 
this work. One of the critiques is that these variables are outcome measures 
and as such don’t reflect “deep” underlying measures. Nevertheless, the 
view  adopted  in  this  paper  is  that  institutions  are  a  stock  variable  that 
results  from  policies  in  a  previous  period  (Dani  Rodrik,  Arvind 
Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, 2002). Thus, the aim is to obtain a 
measure  that  reflects  and  summarizes  public  policies  in  the  previous 
decades. 
Furthermore, the Rule of Law and Corruption Perceptions indexes (used for 
the composite institutions index) are here regarded as a picture a society 
and as such less volatile than the indicators referred by (Edward Glaeser, 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, 2004). 
There  are  also  good  a  priori  reasons  to  include  political  risk  as  a 
determinant: Argentina probably should be wealthier than it is, were it not 
for the persistent periods of political instability (particularly considering the 
outstanding human capital accumulation in this country). (Alberto Alesina 
et  al.,  1996),  among  others,  find  that  political  stability  contributes  to 
economic growth. 
Column 6 shows the averages obtained with the six aggregate measures 
calculated in Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2004 (World Bank).   23
They  are  the  result  of  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  statistical 
compilations  on  responses  on  the  quality  of  governance  and  offer  the 
additional  advantage  of  allowing  for  a  bigger  sample,  as  this  data  is 
available for more countries. The coefficient of correlation between these 
two measures of institutional quality is 0.93. 
Finally, the last columns in this table show measures of early institutions. 
Column 7 reports estimates for constraints on the executive using data from 
(Ted Robert Gurr, 1997). Presented is the average I obtained for the period 
1850-1914 (the period with most voluntary immigration from Europe to the 
New  World).  Column  8  presents  data  on  the  democratisation  process 
during this period using data from the same data source (Ted Robert Gurr, 
1997).  The  estimates  are  obtained  comparing  the  index  of 
democracy/autocracy  in  1914  with  the  same  index  in  1850,  so  that  a 
positive value corresponds to a movement towards more democracy and a 
negative value corresponds to a regressive movement towards autocracy. 
The last column (Early Institutions Index) is the sum of the previous two 
variables. 
Ideally, early institutions should be estimated through a measure of secure 
property  rights  as  this  might  have  been  the  most  important  factor  of 
institutional quality for a migrant willing to establish himself in the western 
hemisphere. Unfortunately, systematic data on property rights do not, to my 
knowledge, exist for this period. 
(Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, 2001) already 
used  constraints  on  the  executive  as  a  measure  of  early  institutions, 
although they used a snapshot estimate for a particular year (1900) instead 
of the average over an extended period as in this work. This variable is 
used  under  the  assumption  that  a  country  with  less  constraints  on  the 
executive is less likely to respect private property rights as it is mostly the 
social groups that capture the state that are likely to usurp someone else’s 
private property for their own benefit. The measure on democratisation was   24
included in response to the argument advanced in (S. Engerman and K. 
Sokoloff, 2002) that the right to suffrage was part of a package of policies 
thought to be potentially attractive to the prospective migrant. It is striking 
that it is  precisely the countries that  competed  for migrants,  and in the 
periods when they hoped to attract them, that moved more firmly away 
from autocracy and towards universal suffrage.          
    
Finally, table A6 presents four different variables that try to summarize 
ethnic  and  linguistic  polarizations  within  a  society.  The  first  column 
presents data on racial tensions and the second column shows data on the 
GUNN1  variable  discussed  in  section  2.1.  The  lowest  levels  for  racial 
tensions are measures for Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. 
On the other hand, racial tensions are highest in Guyana and Trinidad and 
Tobago.  This  country  ranking  would  suggest  that  racial  tensions  are 
minimized in countries where Europeans constitute the majority (Colombia 
is the exception), and are highest in small Caribbean countries where the 
population has multiple origins (native, African, Asian, European). 
However,  a  look  at  the  last  two  columns,  with  data  on  ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, gives a somewhat different picture: the lowest estimates 
are observed for the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Bahamas, and Haiti. 
The highest estimates are now obtained for countries with big Amerindian 
populations or countries that attracted immigrants from different sources 
(Canada, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, USA). The following table shows 
the factors of correlation of the variables in table A6. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Correlation Matrix 
   
  RACIALT  GUNN1  AVELF  ELF60 
RACIALT    -0.221  -0.578  -0.71 
GUNN1      0.832  0.316 
AVELF        0.814   25
    
As expected, the two variables of ethnolinguistic fractionalization have a 
strong and positive relationship. The high correlation between the GUNN1 
and AVELF variables is partly due to the fact that GUNN1 is one of the 
five  measures  utilized  to  obtain  the  average  ethnic  and  linguistic 
fractionalization  (AVELF).  Perhaps  more  interesting  is  the  strong 
association between RACIALT and ELF60. Considering that the causality 
has to go from ethnic composition to racial tensions (and not the other 
way), it seems probable that racial tensions within a society can to a large 
extent be determined by its population mix and level of fractionalization.         
 
 
4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
4.1  From Geography to present-day societies 
 
 
This  section  reports  the  results  of  the  first  stage  ordinary  least-squares 
regressions. Table B1 presents the estimates of regressions with the fraction 
of the population of European descent as dependent variable. The purpose 
is to shed some light into the reasons that determined why some of the 
overseas possessions eventually became settlement colonies while others 
did not. Panel A shows the results with a restricted sample, using only 
independent  countries  whereas  Panel  B  also  includes  Brazilian  federal 
states thereby allowing for a much larger sample. Considering the huge 
differences within Brazil, both in European settlements and in geographic 
terms, there is clearly an opportunity to treat the federal states as if they 
were independent states.   26
Column  (1)  in  Panel  A  shows  the  estimate  with  Log  European  settler 
mortality  rates  (ESM)  as  determinant.  Columns  (2)  to  (8)  show  three 
different  geographic  measures  individually  and  as  joint  regressors.  The 
ESM  variable  is  of  all  determinants  the  one  with  the  least  explanatory 
power. All alternative variables exhibit higher explanatory power and, in 
column  (8),  are  able  to  explain  more  than  half  of  the  variation  in  the 
dependent  variable.  However,  only  one  of  the  determinants  (the  land 
variable) remains significant. A Spanish and a British colonial dummies 
were  also  examined  in  these  regressions  (not  shown)  but  were  always 
found to be statistically not significant. It seems that the identity of the 
colonizer was not a fundamental factor in determining where Europeans 
settled
12. 
 Panel B repeats the same regressions, obviously excluding ESM because 
no ESM data is available for the individual federal states of Brazil. It is still 
possible to explain more than half of the variation in the dependent variable 
but  now  all  three  regressors  remain  statistically  significant  (see  column 
(8)). 
 
Table  B2  is,  to  my  knowledge,  the  first  attempt  at  explaining 
ethnolinguistic  fractionalization.  All  available  variables  that  might 
plausibly be related to ELF60 were examined. Interestingly, it is now the 
ESM variable that is correlated with ELF (columns (1) and (2)), while the 
alternative  geographic  variables  show  little  or  none  explanatory  power 
(columns (3) to (9)). Additionally, the dummies for Spanish and British 
colonies are always statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level and have 
always positive coefficients, suggesting that the levels of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization  are  higher  in  countries  that  were  formerly  British  or 
Spanish colonies. However, these results must be interpreted with care due 
                                                 
12 Although Spain had relatively restrictive immigration policies, some Spanish speaking countries 
competed successfully for European migrants after independence.    27
to the very small omitted group, which consists of only two observations 
(Brazil and Haiti), both with low estimates. 
What seems more indisputable is that ELF tends to be higher in ex-British 
colonies than in the Spanish-speaking world. This might be the result of 
more  immigration  and  from  more  varied  sources  into  English-speaking 
countries.  Apart  from  the  forced  migration  of  Africans,  these  countries 
attracted  economic  migrants  from  all  parts  of  Europe  (particularly  to 
Canada  and  the  USA)  and  contract  labour  from  Asia  (particularly  to 
Guyana  and  Trinidad  and  Tobago).  In  contrast,  Spain  had  much  more 
restrictive immigration policies due to the belief that Spain was suffering 
from underpopulation and because her colonies were better endowed with 
native  labour.  Even  after  independence  only  a  handful  of  the  former 
Spanish  colonies  competed  successfully  for  immigrants  and  from  a 
restricted pool of European nations. 
Columns (4) and (5) in Panel B show that ELF does not vary according to 
the settlement/nonsettlement nature of the colony, as both subsamples have 
exactly the same mean. 
 
So far, we have attempted to explain European settlements exclusively with 
factor endowments but some literature suggests that institutional quality 
might  have  affected  the  directions  of  overseas  migrations.  (Jeffrey  B. 
Nugent  and  Vitória  Saddi,  2002)  question  the  importance  of  land 
registration  and  titling  for  attracting  European  immigrants,  while  (S. 
Engerman  and  K.  Sokoloff,  2002)  make  the  case  for  the  franchise  of 
voting.  At  some  point  institutions  must  matter  and  this  hypothesis  is 
examined in table B3. The regressions are similar to those in table B1 bar 
the  inclusion  of  the  Early  Institutions  Index  (EII)  as  an  additional 
determinant. 
The EII is always statistically significant (albeit in some regressions only at 
the 10% significance level) and the best fit is obtained in column 1 with the   28
land variable as an additional regressor. Adding more variables does not 
improve our results significantly. The estimates suggest that a country with 
average institutions could through this channel attract European settlers that 
make up to 10-15% of its total population. Considering that the average 
fraction  of  population  from  European  descent  is  25%  in  the  western 
hemisphere,  we  can  conclude  that  early  institutions  account  for 
approximately  half  of  the  settlements  at  the  same  time  as  geographical 
factors explain the remaining half. 
Nevertheless, these results must be interpreted with care due to possible 
reverse  causality  between  European  settlements  and  institutions.  (Daron 
Acemoglu,  Simon  Johnson  and  James  A.  Robinson,  2001)  defend  that 
European settlers determined to some extend institutional quality because 
settlement colonies were more likely to adopt a set of institutions similar to 
those known from native Europe. 
In order to exam this topic, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity of 
instruments was conducted.  The basic principle is to use the residuals (νi) 
from the reduced form equation   
 
(1)  EIIi = α + β1LAi + β2INEi  +νi, 
 
Where  EII  is  the  Early  Institutions  Index,  LA  is  the  availability  of 
agriculturally  suitable  land  and  INE  the  inequality  variable  (Gini 
coefficient),  as  an  autonomous  regressor  in  the structural  equation.  The 
structural equation is:  
 
(2)  EURi = α +β1LAi + β2EIIi + β3νi + µi, 
 
where EUR is the fraction of Europeans in total population. Inequality was 
included  in  the  reduced  form  equation  for  being  exogenous  (it  is   29
uncorrelated to European settlements), although it is weakly and negatively 
related to early institutions (factor of correlation is –0.13). 
We test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the residuals νi are not 
statistically different from zero using a simple t test. If we reject the null 
hypothesis at a small significance level, we conclude that Early Institutions 
is endogenous because νi and µi are correlated. 
In this particular case, the t test statistic for β3 in equation (2) is –1.97 (p-
value of 0.066). Thus, there is some evidence of endogeneity in the variable 
Early Institutions. 
Comparing directly OLS and 2SLS estimates and determining whether the 
differences are statistically significant might lead to further evidence for 
endogeneity  between  institutions  and  European  settlements.  If  2SLS 
estimates  differ  significantly  from  OLS  estimates,  we  can  conclude  for 
endogeneity  considering  that  both  OLS  and  IV  estimates  are  consistent 
when all variables are exogenous. 
IV estimates were obtained using inequality (as seen before, uncorrelated to 
European  settlements)  and  a  British  dummy  variable  (weakly  and 
positively  related  to  the  institutions  variable  and  not  a  significant 
determinant of settlements) as instruments for Early Institutions. In both 
cases the coefficient of Early Institutions jumps to values between 0.11 and 
0.14  (not  shown  in  the  tables).  As  expected,  the  new  estimates  for  the 
coefficient  of  institutions  diverge  significantly  from  our  previous  OLS 
estimates  (around  0.03).  These  results  provide  further  evidence  for 
endogeneity  and  suggest  that  the  causality  ran  in  both  directions.  The 
impact  of  institutions  on  European  settlement  as  estimated  through  IV 
seems very large and one or more of the following problems might have 
affected the estimates: i) very small sample with less than 20 degrees of 
freedom and ii) poor instruments. In the present case both instruments are 
only weakly correlated to the endogenous variable. Therefore, even if the 
instruments are only moderately correlated to the error term (they might be   30
correlated to another factor that affects the dependent variable) then the 
inconsistency in the IV estimator can be very large (large asymptotic bias). 
In conclusion, empirical evidence seems to corroborate that both views on 
the  relationship  between  European  settlements  and  institutional  quality 
reflect a significant part of the prevailing causalities. On one hand, AJR’s 
hypothesis  that  settlement  colonies  were  more  likely  to  adopt  a  set  of 
growth inducing institutions (including secure property rights, independent 
judiciary,  etc.)  is  confirmed  through  endogeneity  tests  and  significant 
deviations  between  OLS  and  IV  estimates.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
hypothesis that the set of institutions offered to the migrants determined to 
some  extend  the  success  in  attracting  immigrants  is  equally  confirmed. 
What  is  less  clear  is  the  specific  weight  that  the  institutional  package 
carried as OLS and IV estimates differ significantly. At this point, it seems 
reasonable to advance the hypothesis that the prospect of secure property 
rights and the possibility of ample participation in democratic life accounts 
for at least half the variation in transatlantic migrations and geographical 
factors (particularly the availability of land) accounts for the remaining.  
 
  
4.2    From societal make-up to economic growth       
                
 
So  far  we  have  seen  why  some  parts  of  the  Americas  evolved  into 
settlement colonies or were successful in attracting voluntary migrants after 
accession to independence. The next step, discussed in this section, is to 
examine  the  channels  through  which  these  different  societal  make-ups 
affected development outcomes. As seen in previous sections of this work,   31




￿ More initial human capital  
￿ Better institutions (whether a priori designed to attract prospective 
migrants or as a result of settlers’ a posteriori demands) 
￿ Better provision of public goods in settlement colonies resulted in 
higher capital accumulation 
￿ Lower inequality  
 
Ideally,  these  channels  of  causality  should  be  explored  through  sets  of 
regressions  in  the  two  subgroups  of  countries.  However,  this  approach 
involves reducing an already small sample into two even smaller ones. This 
problem is particularly acute for the countries with a  majority of white 
population as they number only seven in the western hemisphere. 
In order to circumvent this problem it was decided to study the population 
means  and  standard  deviations  of  some  “suspect”  variables for  the  two 
subsets of countries. These descriptive statistics are reported in table C1. 
One of the most striking differences is visible in Log GDP per head as the 
“neo-Europes” have incomes per head which more than double those of the 
non-settlement countries (12120USD versus 5620USD). The difference is 
so  large  that  the  poorest  of  the  settlement  countries  (actually  it  is  the 
Brazilian federal state of Goiás) still has higher income per head than the 
mean  for  non-settlement  countries.  Equally  important,  the  standard 
deviation is lower in both subgroups than for the sample as a whole. 
As regards the explanatory variables, settlement countries exhibit a better 
performance in all of them as measured through the population mean. The 
results  are  particularly  meaningful  for  institutional  quality  as  captured 
                                                 
13 As former settlement colonies are considered all countries that at present have at least half of their 
population from European origin.   32
trough the World Bank Governance Indicators and for early institutions as 
measured through the Variation in Democracy 1850-1914 and the Early 
Institutions Index. For all three variables, the standard deviations are lower 
for both subgroups than for the original sample. 
The results for present-day institutions are not surprising considering that 
settlement countries are wealthier and that  most research finds a strong 
positive relationship between the quality of the institutional framework and 
economic  development.  Perhaps  more  interesting  is  the  relationship 
between settlement and the two measures of early institutions, particularly 
democratisation in 1850-1914: all settlement countries bar the U.S. moved 
decidedly  towards  further  democratisation.  This  process  had  been 
accomplished in the U.S. in an earlier period, and therefore there was no 
(need for) substantial change in this period. The non-settlement countries 
have a mean of –0.4 corresponding to no change or even a slight regression 
towards  autocracy  over  this  period.  Although  some  of  these  countries 
advanced at times towards more democratic institutions, there is no clear 
trend in this subgroup as a whole towards more democracy. 
 
A second group of variables is characterized by equally large differences in 
the population averages but now only one of the subgroups having a lower 
standard deviation. Illiteracy rates in settlement countries are on average 
less than half of those in non-settlement countries (6.1% versus 15.3%) and 
even the worst among the former (Brazil with 12.3%) is below population 
mean  for  the  latter.  Equally  important  is  the  relatively  low  standard 
deviation in the settlement subgroup reflecting the fact that countries where 
whites constitute the majority invest more in mass education. Nevertheless, 
non-settlement countries, although having on average more illiterates, are 
by no means condemned to a low provision of public goods as is attested 
by the large standard deviation. Among the countries in this group that 
have  very  low  rates  of  illiteracy  are  small  Caribbean  states  (Bahamas,   33
Barbados,  Trinidad  &  Tobago,  Suriname,  Guyana),  larger  ones  that 
invested  heavily  in  public  goods  due  to  policy  choice  (Cuba)  and  rich 
federal states of Brazil (Brasília). 
The reasoning for the GUNN1 variable is very similar. On average, only 
2.7% of the population of a settlement country does not understand the 
official language (19.3% in non-settlement countries). Again, the standard 
deviation is very low in the settlement countries, certainly resulting from 
the fact that in all these countries more than 90% of the population speaks 
the official language. The standard deviation for non-settlement countries is 
much  higher  showing  that  belonging  to  this  set  of  countries  is  not 
necessarily an impediment to the official language being understood by all 
groups  of  the  society.  As  seen  in  section  2.1,  this  instrument  of 
discrimination  against  particular  subgroups  of  the  society  is  mostly  a 
preserve of the core areas of Spanish colonization characterized by large 
populations of Amerindians. 
The  last  two  variables  in this  group  of  determinants  involve  aspects  of 
institutional  quality.  The  Composite  Institutions  Index  exhibits  a  low 
standard deviation in the subgroup of non-settlement countries reflecting 
systematically poor institutions, while the standard deviation is somewhat 
higher for the settlement group. This last result can partly be attributed to 
the very low value observed for Argentina (itself certainly exacerbated by 
the severe crisis this country suffered in the last few years) whose specific 
weight is exacerbated in a relatively small sample of seven observations. 
The  Executive  Constraints  in  1850-1914  also  shows  a  low  standard 
deviation  for  the  non-settlement  countries  (symptomatic  of  consistently 
poor  institutions)  with  a  significantly  larger  standard  deviation  for  the 
settlement countries. Some countries in this group (Argentina, Brazil, and 
particularly Chile) were laggards in following the example of the U.S. and 
Costa Rica in building up strong constraints against executive power during 
this period.   34
Of all the  more immediate variables through which Settlement colonies 
might have influenced economic growth the least promising is inequality in 
income  distribution  as  measured  through  the  Gini  index.  Not  only  are 
population means for both groups of countries similar (50.6 for settlement 
countries  and  51.6  for  non-settlement  countries)  but  also  the  respective 
standard deviations remain high following the split. If the population mix is 
not a good predictor of relative inequality then the relevant determinant(s) 
must  be  searched  somewhere  else.  Table  4.2.1  shows  average  Gini 
coefficients per income brackets: 
 
Table 4.2.1: Average Gini Coefficient by income level  
 
               
GDP per head in USD  1610-2500  2501-5000  5001-7500  7501-10000  10001-12500  12501-17500  17501-35750 
               
Average Gini Coefficient  53.7  52.9  51  50.9  53  50.6  37 
(excluding Cuba)      (53.4)         
Number of Observations  4  14  11  9  4  3  2 
                       
 
A clear tendency towards lower levels of income inequality is only visible 
for  the  highest  income  bracket  (including  the  U.S.  and  Canada).  It  is 
possible that settlement countries do not have lower levels of inequality 
because the South and Central American countries in this group are middle 
rather than high-income countries. However, the Kuznets curve hypothesis 
is not confirmed for the western hemisphere, as inequality is not higher in 
middle-income countries than in poorer places. Excluding the odd case of 
the (10000-12500) bracket, a very mitigated trend towards lower inequality 
emerges, though it must be noted that this particular group includes South 
America’s most prosperous regions (comprising Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, 
Argentina, and Rio Grande do Sul).  
These results coincide partly with the findings of (Robert J. Barro, 1999), 
except  for  the  Kuznets  curve,  which  cannot  be  ascertained  for  Latin   35
America. He also found, in a broader panel of countries, little evidence for 
a  strong  relation  between  income  inequality  and  rates  of  growth  and 
investment. 
 
Before we look at level regressions with income levels as the dependent 
variable  it  is  important  to  understand  the  relation  between  European 
settlements and economic development. Specification uncertainty persists 
on  whether  this  relation  is  linear  (more  European  immigrants  have  a 
positive effect on development levels) or if the positive effects of European 
immigration are only established if their share in total population surpasses 
a  certain  threshold.  In  order  to  examine  this  question  two  simple  OLS 
regressions were run, one with the entire sample and one restricted to the 
countries/states where Europeans are a minority. For both, GDP per head is 
the dependent variable and the fraction of Europeans in total population is 
the examined determinant. The results can be seen in the following table: 
 
  Table 4.2.2: Ordinary Least-squares estimates   
   
        
  Total  Europeans < 50%  Europeans > 50% 
  Dependent variable is Log GDP per head in 2002 
C(1)  8.29  8.47  8.43 
Europeans  1.16  0.08  1.16 
  (0.28)  (0.61)  (0.63) 
Number of Observations  56  41  15 
R-squared  0.26  0.001  0.15 
           
Note: heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
The variable Europeans, although significant in the full sample (column 1), 
has no explanatory power when Europeans constitute a minority (column 
2) and is only significant at the 10% significance level when they make up 
the majority of the population (column 3).  
These  estimates  imply  that  the  fraction  of  Europeans  is  irrelevant  for 
determining income levels unless their specific weight in overall population   36
exceeds  a  certain  threshold  (in  this  case  50%  of  the  population).  This 
suggests  that  this  variable  should  be  regarded  as  a  threshold  variable 
instead of a continuous covariate. One interpretation for these results is that 
the proximate determinants through which European settlements influence 
positively  economic  growth  (better  institutions  and  provision  of  public 
goods)  are  only  triggered  when  European  populations  grow  to  be  the 
majority.  Furthermore,  these  results  support  the  view  expressed  in  (S. 
Engerman and K. Sokoloff, 2002) that extreme inequality or heterogeneity 
in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that 
greatly advantaged members of the elite classes and disadvantaged the bulk 
of the population (through education and language for example). It was 
precisely in the countries that actively competed for European migrants that 
the  elite  status  of  the  small  communities  of  old  families  of  European 
descent was firstly eroded.  
 
Table  C2  reports  OLS  regression  estimates  with  income  levels  as  the 
dependent  variable.  Panel  A  examines  the  effect  of  institutions  on 
development and adds geographical factors as additional regressors. The 
institutions variable is always significant at a low significance level and its 
coefficient is remarkably constant around 0.75. However, these estimates 
must be interpreted with care due to probable endogeneity in this variable. 
The dummy for oil exporting countries also has a strong correlation with 
economic performance. This variable explains on average 0.4 log points of 
income per head. Columns (3) and (4) add the disease environment and 
climate  as  additional  determinants.  Both  variables  are  found  to  be 
statistically insignificant once institutions are controlled for (the exception 
is climate in column (6)). 
Panel B shows the regression results with settlement variables as additional 
independent variables. The dummies for Spanish and British colonies, in 
columns (1) and (2), have no explanatory power once institutional quality   37
is taken in the equation. In column (3) we check if European settlements 
affected  economic  development  otherwise  than  through  institutions.  For 
this  purpose,  we  add  a  dummy  for  settlement  colonies  (countries/states 
where Europeans constitute the majority) to the original specification with 
institutions as the only determinant. The results suggest that institutional 
development  is  the  most  significant  channel  through  which  European 
populations  shaped  development  outcomes.  It  is,  as  yet,  too  early  to 
completely  rule  out  further  channels  of  transmission,  but  it  seems 
reasonable to assume that any additional avenue carries less specific weight 
than institutional development. 
 
Table C3 scrutinizes more possible determinants of economic development. 
Columns  (1)  to  (4)  add  measures  of  ethnic/racial  tensions  and 
ethnolinguistic  fractionalization.  All  are  found  to  be  statistically 
insignificant  after  controlling  for  institutions  and  do  not  improve 
significantly to the overall fit. Column (5) examines the hypothesis that 
discrimination based on language might have a lasting impact on economic 
performance but finds little evidence to support this view. The estimated 
coefficient has the “correct” sign (negative relation between the fraction of 
the  population  that  does  not  speak  the  official  language  and  economic 
development) but is not statistically significant and has little impact on the 
estimated  coefficient  for  institutions.  More  promising  is  the  equation 
shown in column (6), as human capital (here measured through illiteracy 
rates) remains significant once institutions are controlled for.  
We should note at this point that illiteracy rates are treated as exogenous in 
this equation although they are likely to be endogenous. Wagner’s law says 
that more developed countries tend to spend proportionally more on public 
goods thereby implying that wealthier countries have ceteris paribus lower 
rates of illiteracy. Therefore, little credit should be given to the estimated 
coefficient  of  illiteracy  rates.  It  will  be  revised  at  a  later  stage  once  a   38
suitable instrument for human capital is found. Equally important is that the 
estimated  coefficient  for  institutions  is  now  at  0.58  substantially  lower. 
This is probably due to the inclusion of an endogenous variable correlated 
with  income  or  institutions,  which  will typically  bias the  coefficient  on 
institutions downwards. The resulting coefficient is likely to underestimate 
the effect of institutions on income. 
Finally, in column (7) the two variables previously found to be significant 
are  included  in  the  baseline  specification  with  institutions  as  the  main 
determinant.  Both,  illiteracy  rates  and  institutional  quality  remain 
significant but the dummy for oil exporting countries looses most of its 
predictive power as its coefficient collapses to a value which is about half 
of the previous estimates. 
 
Table  C4  reports  IV  regression  results  with  otherwise  similar  model 
specifications.  The  instrument  of  choice  for  institutions  is  disease 
environment in 1950, following the findings of (Luís Vaz Silva, 2004). Of 
the other two plausible instruments proposed in this paper, using climate as 
instrumental  variable  results  in  the  same  overall  trends  to  those  here 
reported (notwithstanding somewhat higher coefficients on institutions) and 
using the land variable as instrument bears inconsistent estimates due to 
very low correlation with institutions in this sample. 
Panel A includes geographical and settlement variables, of which only the 
dummy for oil exporting (column (2)) and the land variable (column (3)) 
remain significant. The equation in column (3) shows that countries with 
big  concentrations  of  Amerindian  populations  can  expect  lower  income 
levels  than  countries  with  lower  local  population  densities  and 
consequently  greater  abundance  of  available  farmland.  Institutional 
development might not have been the exclusive channel of transmission 
that handicapped the core areas of Spanish colonisation in the new world 
characterized  by  large  Amerindian  populations  explored  by  a  small   39
European elite. Conversely, countries with wide-open spaces might have 
benefited in more than one way from their initial endowment. 
Just  as  interesting  are  the  coefficients  on  the  identity  of  the  colonizer 
visible in  columns  (5)  and (6), as they  replicate  the  findings in (Daron 
Acemoglu,  Simon  Johnson  and  James  A.  Robinson,  2001).  Both  are 
statistically  insignificant  and  the  coefficients  are  close  to  zero.  In  this 
specification, where the effect of institutions on economic development is 
controlled for, the coefficient on Spanish colony is now marginally positive 
and the coefficient on British colony becomes negative. (Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, 2001) interpret these results with a 
possible  overestimation  of  institutional  quality  in  English-speaking 
countries that is subsequently ”corrected” in the second-stage effect. 
Panel  B  examines  the  variables  previously  seen  in  table  C3.  All  are 
statistically  insignificant  including  the  illiteracy  rate  in  column  (6). 
However, this variable is still considered exogenous thereby mitigating the 
importance of this result. The last column adds the dummy for oil exporting 
countries to the specification in column (6). This dummy variable has now 
enhanced explanatory power and its estimated impact on income levels is 
0.3  log  points.  This  model  implies  that  oil-exporting  countries  such  as 
Mexico and Trinidad & Tobago, with GDP per capita of around 9000USD 
should have income levels more in the level of the Dominican Republic 
(6500-7000USD)  considering  their  institutional development  and  human 
capital  accumulation.  The  coefficient  of institutions  remains  remarkably 
constant in the 0.8-0.85 range. 
 
Table C5 addresses the problem of endogeneity in the education variable. 
The first four columns propose different instruments that might plausibly 
be related to levels of education and that had been shown to have little, if 
any,  relation  to  economic  performance.  The  instruments  here  tested  are 
relative  inequality  in  income  distribution,  the  land  variable,  European   40
settler mortality rates and climate. The coefficients are insignificant at the 
10% significance level in all regressions, although they have always the 
“correct” sign and a plausible magnitude of around 0.03 log points for each 
additional percentage point in the illiteracy rate. Perhaps, the best fit is 
obtained in column (4) with climate as instrument for education, with a p-
value for the coefficient on illiteracy of around 0.1. The last column adds 
the  dummy  for  oil  to the  previous  specification  although  its  coefficient 
collapses  to  half  (0.15  log  points)  and  is  no  longer  significant  once 
institutions and human capital are controlled for. On the other hand, the 
illiteracy  variable  sees  its  explanatory  power  enhanced  (p-value  is  now 
0.068) and the estimated effect on income levels remains stable at around 
0.03 log points. This means that if El Salvador could halve its illiteracy rate 
from 20% to 10% of the adult population than it could anticipate seeing its 
income levels rise in the long term to the level of the Dominican Republic 
(from around 4900USD to around 6600USD). 
The estimated effect of institutions on economic performance remains large 
and relatively stable at around 0.7 log points throughout all regressions in 
table  C5.  This  implies  that  if  Argentina  could  improve  its  institutional 
quality as measured through the World Bank Governance Indicators by one 
unit (to the level of Costa Rica’s) than it could expect to see its income 
levels  double  to  around  22000USD  in  the  long  term.  Conversely,  if 
Ecuador improves its institutional framework to an intermediate level (as in 
Brazil or Mexico) than its GDP per head could rise to around 6000USD 
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      In  this  paper  we  looked  at  economic  development  in  the  western 
hemisphere  over  the  last  few  centuries.  The  sample  was  deliberately 
restricted  to  North  and  South  American  countries  because  some  of  the 
explanatory factors we use to explain diverging growth paths are intrinsic 
to this hemisphere. This is certainly the case of European settlements, as 
their importance is mostly confined to the Americas and Australia. The 
varying  importance  of  European  settlements  suggests  significant 
heterogeneity in explanatory factors of income levels, a topic that has been 
hitherto little explored by literature on economic development. 
Although the settlement hypothesis had been already advanced in previous 
literature,  many  questions  persisted  on  the  mechanisms  through  which 
European  migrants  affected  income  levels  and  why  only  a  handful  of 
countries were successful in attracting voluntary migration from overseas. 
Our  work  finds  evidence  that  factor  endowments  (temperate  climate, 
abundance of farmland, and benign disease ecology) were instrumental in 
explaining European settlements in the northern and southern tips of the 
hemisphere. More intriguing is the case of Costa Rica, highly successful in 
competing for settlers despite its tropical location. This exception leads us 
to  the  second  important  factor  for  explaining  European  settlements: 
institutional development. At least some dimensions of institutional quality, 
including secure property rights and franchise of voting, must have been 
important  to  the  prospective  migrant.  The  corollary  is  that  institutions 
should  not  be  treated  as  exogenous,  as  they  have  a  strong  positive 
relationship with European settlements. The causality is likely to flow in 
both  directions:  on  one  hand,  settlement  countries  designed  a  priori  an 
institutional  package  intended  to  attract  migrants,  and  benefited 
subsequently from their strong demands for better land registration/titling 
and law enforcement.        
The data support the view that institutions are the single most important 
channel of transmission between settlements and economic performance. A   42
second  proximate  determinant  through  which  settlements  affected 
economic development is the provision of public goods, specifically mass 
education.  I  do  not  find  strong  evidence  for  inequality  in  income 
distribution  being  significantly  correlated  with  settlement  countries  or 
growth  outcomes.  Figure  5.1  presents  a  scheme  with  the  channels  of 
causality that were avowed in this study. 
A  related  finding  is  that  the  fraction  of  the  population  from  European 
descent  should  not  be  considered  a  continuous  covariate.  Most  of  the 
beneficial effects associated with European populations (better institutions 
and greater investment in public goods) are only triggered when settlers 
grow to become the majority. One possible explanation is that trust does 
not travel easily across ethnic lines: European minorities are less willing to 
invest  in  mass  education  when  most  of  the  beneficiaries  are  from  a 
different ethnic group. Furthermore, an independent judiciary and further 
democratisation are unlikely outcomes when a small elite captures the state 
in order to disadvantage the majority of the population. 
 Fortunately,  this  all  does  not  mean  that  the  settlement/non-settlement 
dichotomy  is  deterministic  for  growth  outcomes.  Although  it  explains 
much  of  the  diverging  growth  paths  in  the  American  mainland,  some 
countries were able to escape this logic. This is particularly evident for 
some  island  nations  in  the  Caribbean  (The  Bahamas,  Barbados),  which 
achieved relatively high levels of income despite never having competed 
for permanent European settlers. It seems that these small countries have 
been major beneficiaries of the greater mobility in service industries that 
has characterized the last decades. This trend is just as visible in other parts 
of the world; for example in the African continent where island nations 
such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, or Cape Verde, achieved higher levels of 
economic development than their counterparts on the mainland. 
While this paper contributes to the growing literature on development in 
the  long  run  by  examining  the  complex  interplay  between  factor   43
endowments,  institutional  structure  and  development  outcomes,  some 
drawbacks persist in this field. Historical data on many of the most relevant 
aspects  of  institutional  quality  is  not  available  systematically. 
Consequently, executive restraints in 1850-1914 were used as a proxy for 
secure property rights in the same period due to missing data on the total 
precision  of  the  land  law  in  the  19
th  century.  Also,  a  process  of 
democratisation in this period is arguably more relevant for explaining the 
attractiveness of a newly independent country to prospective migrants than 
for explaining subsequent patterns of economic growth. Recent literature 
on this topic has often concluded that the causality is more likely to flow 
from  development  to  democratisation  than  the  other  way  round
14. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that most examples of autocratic, yet good-
for-growth, regimes come from East Asia with few, if any, cases in the 
Americas. 
Another  source  of  concern  is  related  to  the  difficulty  in  explaining  the 
diverging  growth  paths  between  the  North  American  countries  on  one 
hand, and Argentina and Uruguay on the other. Personal interpretations on 
this topic are at two a penny but few are substantiated with data analysis
15. 
These two  South  American countries  are  almost unique in having once 
been prosperous and migrating subsequently to the group of middle-income 
countries. Certainly, other developed countries have in their past suffered 
from more or less prolonged periods of economic and institutional decline, 
but  these  could  normally  be  reversed  at  some  point.  One  of  the  most 
outstanding contrasts between these two groups of countries regards the 
very  different  patterns  of  landownership,  which  was  much  more 
widespread in North America. Unfortunately, this avenue of research could 
not be explored in this work for want of more comprehensive historical 
data on dissemination of landownership in this part of the world.      
                                                 
14 See, for example, Glaeser, Edward; La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, 
Andrei. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," NBER Working Paper Series. Cambridge, MA, 2004.. 
15 For example, Landes, David S. (The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1999) attributes higher income levels in North America to superior culture there.   44
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Figure 1.1: Two Theories that explain change 
in land laws
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